

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 NEW DE 12209 01 OF 0:* 192133Z

61

ACTION NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 EA-11 ISO-00 IO-14 SAJ-01 CIAE-00

DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04

RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20 USIA-15 ACDA-19 NIC-01

DRC-01 AEC-11 /173 W

----- 029320

R 191650Z OCT 73

FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7469

INFO AMEMBASSY COLOMBO

AMEMBASSY DACCA

AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

AMEMBASSY KABUL

AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU

AMEMBASSY RANGOON

AMEMBASSY TAIPEI

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

USLO PEKING

AMEMCONSUL BOMBAY

AMCONSUL CALCUTTA

AMCONSUL HONG KONG

AMCONSUL MADRAS

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY LONDON

CINCPAC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 NEW DELHI 12209

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, IN, CH

SUBJECT: THE FRAMEWORK AND PROSPECTS OF SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 NEW DE 12209 01 OF 02 192133Z

BEGIN SUMMARY: CHINA IS A CENTRAL PREOCCUPATION OF INDIAN POLICY AND THE REMAINING OBSTACLE TO INDIA'S OBJECTIVE OF ACCEPTED PRE-EMINENCE IN SOUTH ASIA. INDIA IS CONCERNED WITH CHINA'S MILITARY STRENGTH, ITS CONTINUING FIRM SUPPORT OF PAKISTAN, THE POSTENTIAL DANGERS OF CHINESE INFLUENCE IN BANGLADESH, AND THE INCLINATION OF OTHER SMALLER NEIGHBORS TO LOOK TO CHINA TO BALANCE INDIAN INFLUENCE. WE BELIEVE INDIA APPROACHES THE CHINA PROBLEM FROM A POSITION OF OBJECTIVE AND DEEP PSYCHOLOGICAL INFERIORITY. INDIA RECOGNIZES THAT CHINA'S POSTURE DETERMINES INDIA'S SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY ALTERNATIVES. INDIA HAS PUT ASIDE THE OPTIONS OF TOUGHNESS TOWARD CHINA, OF CLOSER INDO-SOVIET MILITARY TIES, AND OF CUTTING LOOSE FROM SOVIET SUPPORT TO MEET A CENTRAL CHINESE CONCERN. INSTEAD INDIA SEEKS TO BLUNT THE THREATS OF CHINESE HOSTILITY AND GAIN MANEUVERABILITY BY SEEKING BETTER RELATIONS THROUGH LIMITED GESTURE TOWARD PEKING. INDIA'S IMMEDIATE CONCERN IS

TO IMPROVE THE PUBLIC TONE OF SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS. THE BORDER PROBLEM AND TRADE ARE LESS PRESSING. ITS OVERTURES TOWARD CHINA ARE GENERALLY SUPPORTED BY DOMESTIC SENTIMENT. THE SOVIETS HERE TRY TO MUDDY THE WATERS AS THEY CAN AND THE CHINESE IN DELHI RESENT THE SOVIETS' ANTI-CHINESE ACTIVITIES. WE EXPECT A SLOW UNSTEADY MOVEMENT TOWARD NORMALIZATION LIMITED PRIMARILY BY THE INTERPLAY OF CHINA'S CONCERN OVER SOVIET INFLUENCE IN INDIA AND INDIA'S CONCERN WITH CHINA'S RELATIONS WITH INDIA'S NEIGHBORS, PARTICULARLY BANGLADESH. WHILE NORMALIZATION IS IN THE US INTEREST, OUR POSTURE SHOULD BE ONE OF ONLY PASSIVE ENCOURAGEMENT AND WE SHOULD LEAVE IT TO INDIA AND CHINA TO MOVE AT THEIR OWN SLOW PACE TOWARD BETTER RELATIONS. END SUMMARY.

1. FOR INDIA, CHINA IS A CENTRAL PROBLEM OF SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY. IT IS OUR GENERAL IMPRESSION THAT INDIA APPROACHES THIS PROBLEM FROM A POSITION OF OBJECTIVE AND DEEP PSYCHOLOGICAL INFERIORITY. SINCE THE EARLY SIXTIES, FEAR OF DIRECT CHINESE ATTACK HAS DROPPED TO NEAR ZERO. BUT INDIA REMAINS SENSITIVE TO CHINA'S SUPERIOR MILITARY POWER AND JUSTIFIES (AS MRS. GANDHI DID JUST THIS WEEK) ITS OWN LARGE MILITARY FORCES IN TERMS OF A POTENTIAL TWO-FRONT THREAT FROM CHINA AND FROM PAKISTAN. IT SEES CHINA AS THE ONLY NUCLEAR THREAT TO INDIA AND THIS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 NEW DE 12209 01 OF 02 192133Z

THREAT IS CITED BY THOSE WHO BELIEVE INDIA SHOULD ITSELF "GO NUCLEAR".

2. THE PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVE OF INDIA POLICY IS EFFECTIVE AND RECOGNIZED PREEMINENCE IN SOUTH ASIA. CHINA IS A MAJOR OBSTACLE. INDIA WILL NOT FEEL IT HAS FULLY ACHIEVED ITS OBJECTIVE WHILE ANY OTHER SOUTH ASIAN STATE HAS DISTINCTIVE AND INDEPENDENT SECURITY LINKS TO ANOTHER MAJOR POWER. INDIA IS COMING TO BELIEVE

THE UNITED STATES HAD DISENGAGED FROM SUCH A POSITION. BUT CHINA HAS NOT. SO LONG AS IT DOES NOT, SINO-INDIAN TENSIONS WILL PERSIST. THE INDO-SOVIET TREATY WAS IN PART A CONSEQUENCE OF INDIA'S CONCERN OVER CHINA IN THE BANGLADESH CRISIS AND SOVIET INTEREST IN EXPLOITING THIS FEAR. THUS THE CHINA ISSUE IS AT THE HEART OF THE INDO-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP.

3. MOREOVER, UNDERLYING INDIAN ATTITUDES IS PROBABLY THE SUSPICION THAT REGARDLESS OF HOW FAR INDIA MIGHT GO IN WOOING PEKING--EVEN TO THE POINT OF FUNDAMENTALLY ALTERING THE INDO-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP--THE CHINESE WOULD CONTINUE TO AIM AT HOLDING INDIA IN A SUBORDINATE INTERNATIONAL STATUS, PRESERVING CHINESE RELATIONSHIPS WITH INDIA'S NEIGHBORS, AND DENYING INDIA'S CLAIMS TO PREEMINENCE IN SOUTH ASIA.

4. INDIA THUS REMAINS HIGHLY SUSPICIOUS OF CHINESE ACTIVITIES AND INTENTIONS TOWARD THE SUBCONTINENT, AND OF ANY SIGNIFICANT TILT OF ITS NEIGHBORS TOWARD CHINA. IN VARYING DEGREES INDIA'S NEIGHBORS MISTRUST IT, DISLIKE IT, AND LOOK TO CHINA TO BALANCE AND CURTAIL INDIAN INFLUENCE. INDIA IS marginally LESS CONCERNED ABOUT SINO-SRI LANKA RELATIONS THAN POTENTIAL CHINESE INFLUENCE ON THE NORTHERN BORDER IN NEPAL AND BHUTAN. OF GREATEST CONCERN ARE PAKISTAN AND FOR THE FUTURE BANGLADESH.

5. CHINA'S MILITARY AND POLITICAL SUPPORT OF A TRUNCATED PAKISTAN IS SEEN THROUGH INDIAN EYES AS INCREASING PAKISTAN'S BARGAINING POWER, MAKING ENMITY TOWARD INDIA A CREDIBLE ALTERNATIVE TO COOPERATION ON INDIAN TERMS, AND LEADING PAKISTAN AWAY FROM THE BILATERALISM OF SIMLA TO SOLUTIONS FOR THE SUBCONTINENT COMPATIBLE WITH NON-INDIA INTERESTS. BUT IN CONTRAST TO ITS CAMPAIGN AGAINST US MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN AND US INTERFERENCE, INDIA HAS NOT CHALLENGED CHINA ON THESE ACTIVITIES. IN THE CONTEXT OF CHINESE HOSTILITY AND CONTEMPT, INDIA

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 NEW DE 12209 01 OF 02 192133Z

HAS NO LEVERAGE AND COMPLAINTS WOULD STRENGTHEN CHINA'S CONVICTION THAT IT IS SUCCESSFULLY FRUSTRATING INDIAN POLICY.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 19 OCT 1973
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1973NEWDE12209
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS MOYNIHAN
Errors: N/A
Film Number: n/a
From: NEW DELHI
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1973/newtext/t19731021/aaaaaph.tel
Line Count: 156
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: ACTION NEA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags: ANOMALY
Review Date: 28 AUG 2001
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <28-Aug-2001 by boyleja>; APPROVED <18-Dec-2001 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: THE FRAMEWORK AND PROSPECTS OF SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS CONFIDENTIAL
TAGS: PFOR, IN, CH
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005